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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this Comment is to provide a philosophical commentary on the morality of targeted 
killing under the laws of war, particularly when the United States turns its sights on its own 
citizens.  Although the conclusions drawn are largely antithetical to current practices, they provide 
a further critique in the broader discussion of targeted killing.  This Comment posits that due 
process can never be adequately satisfied when targeted killing is turned against one’s own 
citizens.  The moral implications associated with targeting one’s own citizens should not be 
allowed; rather than defer to International Humanitarian Law, a human rights model as well as 
domestic law should be used in assessing the United States’ targeted killing of American citizens, 
as these models allow for the utmost preservation of the lives of those being targeted. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Within the War on Terror, it is no secret that the United States is 
engaged in a practice known as targeted killing.  Justifying its actions as part 
of an ongoing war with al-Qaeda, the United States employs drones, often 
remotely piloted by Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”) officials, to kill 
those insurgents it deems a threat to the American people.  Killing in such a 
remote manner simultaneously removes the target from the battlefield while 
Jan. 2013] TARGETED KILLING 923 
 
also “‘remov[ing] potentially messy questions of surrender.’”1  And whether 
or not there is an official CIA roster of those slated to be killed, this makes it 
no less than a hit list. 
All killing in war is essentially a type of killing via target, as one’s arms 
are necessarily aimed at a specific enemy.  Consequently, targeted killing for 
the purposes of this Comment will be defined as the “premeditated killing 
by a state of a specifically identified person not in its custody.”2  Whereas 
proponents of targeted killing insist upon its legality when used against 
enemies in either self-defense or under the laws of war, its critics condemn it 
as “extrajudicial assassination.”3  However, whether or not targeted killing is 
lawful does not necessarily mean that it is a prudent mechanism with which 
to carry out a conflict. 
This Comment examines the permissibility, under general principles of 
the laws of war and morality, of the Obama Administration’s recent use of 
the technique of targeted killings to fight the War on Terror.  Specifically, 
when is it permissible to engage in targeted killing, and is it permissible for 
the United States to engage in the targeted killing of an American citizen 
under the general principles of the laws of war?  This Comment argues that, 
under the laws of war, one’s citizenship does not always factor into the 
analysis of the use of targeted killing; in fact, under the laws of war, an 
enemy’s citizenship is irrelevant to the analysis of whether a country can use 
force against that enemy in a traditional war.  If a person being targeted has 
not made himself open to attack under the laws of war, force is not 
warranted, regardless of his citizenship.  But when the United States 
specifically targets its own citizens, no amount of due process is sufficient to 
justify circumventing an American citizen’s right to life.  The practice of 
targeted killing by the United States against its own citizens should be strictly 
forbidden. 
 
 1 Tara Mckelvey, Inside the Killing Machine, DAILY BEAST (Feb. 13, 2011, 10:00 AM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/02/13/inside-the-killing-machine.html 
(quoting Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing in U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy and Law, in 
LEGISLATING THE WAR ON TERROR:  AN AGENDA FOR REFORM 346–400 (Benjamin Wittes 
ed., 2009)). 
 2 Richard Murphy & Afsheen John Radsan, Due Process and Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 31 
CARDOZO L. REV. 405, 406 (2009).  Note that in Murphy and Radsan’s definition, targeted 
killing is also defined as “extra-judicial.”  This portion of their definition is not used in 
this Comment so as to avoid the negative connotations that “extra-judicial” would 
unnecessarily bring to the analysis of targeted killing.  Id. 
 3 Afsheen John Radsan & Richard Murphy, Measure Twice, Shoot Once:  Higher Care for CIA-
Targeted Killing, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1201, 1204 (2011).  See also David Kretzmer, Targeted 
Killing of Suspected Terrorists:  Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence?, 16 EUR. 
J. INT’L L. 171, 173 (2005) (detailing that targeted killings by the United States and Israel 
“have been castigated by human rights NGOs, and some UN bodies as ‘extra-judicial 
executions’”). 
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To reach the aforementioned conclusions, this Comment analyzes the 
laws of war and morality in order to inform the legal context of targeted 
killing within the United States.  As such, just war theory and International 
Humanitarian Law4 weigh heavily throughout the Comment’s analysis.  
Inherent in the questions presented is the idea that targeted killing is 
sometimes justified against non-U.S. citizens.  Though it is beyond the scope 
of this Comment to engage in a more in-depth, normative discussion of this 
conclusion, the following arguments will inform the subject of targeted 
killing in general. 
To evaluate the controversial topic of targeted killing, Part I of this 
Comment provides a brief overview of just war theory and the case of Anwar 
al-Aulaqi, an American citizen executed via targeted killing.  This serves as a 
background for more detailed arguments set forth in later portions of the 
Comment.  Part II looks to the issue of status, specifically the combatant 
versus non-combatant distinction under just war theory, as well as the 
importance of uniforms in evaluating combatant status.  The increasing 
introduction of non-traditional combatants in hostilities makes this 
distinction of utmost importance.  Building on the analysis of status, Part III 
examines the manner in which the United States carries out targeted killing, 
specifically when the CIA plays a part.  Part IV considers the imminence 
required by just war theory, in addition to the constraints of proportionality 
and military necessity.  The distinction between traditional war and the War 
on Terror is explored in Part V, with an emphasis on conflict 
characterization in the War on Terror.  It is asserted in these first sections 
that one’s citizenship does not play a role in many calculations regarding 
targeted killing.  Oftentimes targeted killing and even the use of force in 
general should not be used, as the person that is being targeted has not 
made himself liable to be attacked under the laws of war.  There are times 
when targeted killing is warranted against no one.  In terms of the United 
States targeting its own citizens, Part VI, the final section, asserts that no 
amount of due process can be implemented to circumvent an American 
citizen’s right to life; targeted killing by the United States against American 
citizens is thereby prohibited.  Moreover, the moral implications associated 
with targeting one’s own citizens should not be allowed.  Rather than defer 
to International Humanitarian Law, a human rights model as well as 
domestic law should be used in assessing the United States’ targeted killing 
of American citizens, as these models allow for the utmost preservation of 
 
 4 The distinction between the laws of war and International Humanitarian Law is 
essentially obsolete due to their integration into the 1977 First Additional Protocol to the 
Geneva Conventions.  Orna Ben-Naftali & Keren R. Michaeli, ‘We Must Not Make a 
Scarecrow of the Law’:  A Legal Analysis of the Israeli Policy of Targeted Killings, 36 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 233, 254 (2003). 
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the lives of those being targeted.  Ultimately, the goal of this Comment is to 
provide a philosophical commentary on the morality of targeted killing 
under the laws of war, particularly when the United States turns its sights on 
its own citizens.  Although the conclusions drawn are largely antithetical to 
current practices, they provide a further critique in the broader discussion 
of targeted killing. 
I.  BACKGROUND:  JUST WAR THEORY AND THE CASE OF AL-AULAQI 
In order to evaluate targeted killing under just war theory, the case of 
Anwar al-Aulaqi will be informative throughout this Comment.  Born in New 
Mexico, al-Aulaqi was a Muslim cleric of dual U.S.-Yemeni citizenship.5  He 
was a propagandist for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (“AQAP”) and was 
thought to have played a key part in recruiting Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, 
the man who attempted an airline bombing in Detroit on December 25, 
2009.6  Al-Aulaqi also e-mailed with Nidal Hasan six months prior to Hasan’s 
murder of thirteen men at Fort Hood in November 2009.7  And although he 
was never formally charged in either incident, al-Aulaqi was placed on the 
United States government’s kill or capture list in April of 2010, apparently 
with White House approval.8  On September 30, 2011, at the age of forty, al-
Aulaqi was killed via a U.S. drone strike, along with Pakistani-American 
Samir Khan.9  Khan, who produced a magazine for AQAP promoting 
terrorism, was not on the targeted killing list, and was considered “collateral 
damage.”10  As for al-Aulaqi, officials alleged that his role went “beyond 
inspiration into operational planning of attacks,” but no proof of such 
planning has surfaced, and al-Aulaqi received no trial or judicial review.11  
One month later, al-Aulaqi’s son, sixteen-year-old Abdulrahman al-Aulaqi, 
also an American citizen, was killed on October 14, 2011 in another 
 
 5 John C. Dehn & Kevin Jon Heller, Debate, Targeted Killing:  The Case of Anwar Al-Aulaqi, 
159 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 175, 175 (2011). 
 6 Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2011, 
at A1 [hereinafter Savage, Secret U.S. Memo]; Charlie Savage, Nigerian Man Is Indicted in 
Attempted Plane Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2010, at A14. 
 7 David Cole, Killing Citizens in Secret, NYRBLOG (Oct. 9, 2011, 11:15 PM), 
http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2011/oct/09/killing-citizens-secret. 
 8 Dehn & Heller, supra note 5, at 175; Claire Finkelstein, Targeted Killing as Preemptive Action, 
in TARGETED KILLINGS:  LAW AND MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL WORLD 156, 160 (Claire 
Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin & Andrew Altman eds., 2012) (referring to the Joint 
Prioritized Effects List as a “kill or capture” list). 
 9 Yemen:  U.S. strike kills al Qaeda media chief, CBS NEWS (Oct. 15, 2011), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/10/15/501364/main20120883.shtml. 
 10 Savage, Secret U.S. Memo, supra note 6, at A12. 
 11 Editorial, Justifying the Killing of an American, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2011, at A22 [hereinafter 
Justifying the Killing of an American]. 
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airstrike.  Abdulrahman al-Aulaqi was never alleged to be a part of al-Qaeda, 
and was in fact collateral damage in the targeting of another man.12 
Under just war theory, a distinction has historically been drawn between 
jus ad bellum and jus in bello.  In general, the former deals with war itself, the 
responsibility of which is not attributed to soldiers but to a nation’s leaders, 
and the latter deals with the conduct of war, the responsibility of which is 
indeed attributed to soldiers for their own activity.13  Traditional just war 
theory makes such a distinction so as to indemnify soldiers who take part in 
criminal wars through no fault of their own, for war is a relation between 
political entities; “the enemy soldier, though his war may well be criminal, is 
nevertheless as blameless as oneself.”14  Just war theory, rooted in customary 
international law, is needed so as to reduce the suffering of war and to allow 
belligerent states to coexist even after a war.15  If it were not for such 
customs, war would be an unlimited battle to the death.  As Prussian military 
theorist Karl von Clausewitz stated, “‘War is an act of force . . . which 
theoretically can have no limits.’”16  Enemy states under just war theory are 
treated with a sort of restraint and accommodation so as to ensure stability 
in the world order; this stability is dependent “upon mutual understandings” 
in “a world of shared values.”17 
Within the precepts of jus in bello, then, there are certain practices that 
must be followed by states on both sides of a war.  The justness or unjustness 
of a war in terms of jus ad bellum plays no role, traditionally, in the jus in bello 
framework.  That is, it is quite possible for an unjust war to be fought justly, 
in strict accordance with the laws of war, and for a just war to be fought 
unjustly.18  Even if a state is engaged in an unjust war, its soldiers still retain 
the right to wound and kill enemy soldiers who are fighting a just war, 
 
 12 Craig Whitlock, After Yemen attack, little comment, WASH. POST., Oct. 23, 2011, at A3. 
 13 MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS:  A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL 
ILLUSTRATIONS 38–39 (4th ed. 2006).  As jus ad bellum and jus in bello are incredibly 
complex topics, for the purpose of this Comment, these definitions have been 
generalized somewhat. 
 14 Id. at 36.  See also Christopher Kutz, The Difference Uniforms Make:  Collective Violence in 
Criminal Law and War, 33 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 148, 152–53 (2005)  (arguing that war is a 
form of “collective exculpation,” granting “permission to do together what would be 
infamous crimes if done separately” (emphasis omitted)). 
 15 Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 4, at 255 (setting forth the underlying premise of just 
war theory). 
 16 WALZER, supra note 13, at 23. 
 17 Id. at 116.  The United States, not only as part of the world order, but as a world leader, 
should follow the rules of just war theory.  Moreover, as a signatory to the Geneva 
Conventions, it is obligated to do so.  Note, however, that the United States has not 
ratified the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. 
 18 See id. at 110 (characterizing a just war as one that is morally urgent to win). 
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provided they respect the norms of proportionality and discrimination set 
forth under International Humanitarian Law.19 
II.  STATUS:  THE PRINCIPLE OF DISTINCTION BETWEEN COMBATANTS 
AND NON-COMBATANTS 
Though the distinction between just and unjust causes is important, the 
principle point of distinction between combatants and non-combatants is 
status.  Whether or not one is a combatant plays a key role in just war theory.  
Non-combatants are not liable to be attacked under just war theory; only 
other combatants may be the aim of one’s aggression.20  Yet if non-
combatants take part in hostilities, they in effect breach their duty not to do 
so, which “results in the loss of the special protection to which non-
combatants are entitled.”21  In terms of capture, combatants cannot be 
prosecuted once captured because they are entitled to fight; rather, they 
receive prisoner of war status if taken by the enemy.22  Conversely, non-
combatants taking part in hostilities can indeed be prosecuted, as they are 
not entitled to fight by virtue of their non-combatant status.23 
A. Status in the War on Terror 
However, such distinctions are not so easy to make when combatant 
status is blurred.  “As ever more warfare involves stipulatively unprivileged 
combatants, the normative systems controlling war become more and more 
strained.”24  Whereas the Geneva Protocols only accord prisoner of war status 
to combatants wearing uniforms or who wear “a fixed, distinctive sign 
recognizable at a distance,” it is now often the case that combatants do not 
wear unique markings to show their status.25  And the problem is not just 
one that arises with our enemies.  When CIA field operatives take part in 
hostilities, they too blur the line of combatant status:  they serve out of 
uniform, without clear, outward evidence of their national affiliation.  At 
issue is whether we can assess the legitimacy of the treatment of non-
traditional combatants as they relate to the War on Terror. 
 
 19 Kutz, supra note 14, at 157. 
 20 WALZER, supra note 13 at 135–37. 
 21 Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 4, at 265.  See also JEFF MCMAHAN, KILLING IN WAR 12 
(2009) (“If posing a threat is the criterion of liability to attack in war, then combatants 
are liable but noncombatants are not.”). 
 22 Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 4, at 265.  See also WALZER, supra note 13, at 46–47. 
 23 Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 4, at 265. 
 24 Kutz, supra note 14, at 155–56. 
 25 Id. at 151.  This illustration is derived from actual events and is meant as a mirror for what 
actually occurs.  Id. at 148. 
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Although war is usually portrayed under just war theory as combat 
between combatants, it is necessary to assess whether those who take part in 
the War on Terror are combatants within the traditional sense, because it 
has bearing on whether they can be the objects of targeted killing.  Indeed, 
“one of the primary reasons for distinguishing combatants from non-
combatants is that only combatants are legitimate targets.”26  Under 
International Humanitarian Law, the targeted killing of suspected terrorists 
may be lawful if they can be regarded as combatants.27  Since the group al-
Qaeda is not a member of a nation-state, the conflict between the United 
States and al-Qaeda is necessarily a non-international conflict.28 
Given this distinction of the War on Terror as a non-traditional conflict, 
it must be assessed whether al-Qaeda fighters are considered combatants or 
non-combatants.  Under one view, terrorists do not even meet the 
conditions of the Geneva Conventions set forth to apply to militias or 
volunteer corps, and thus must be regarded as civilians.29  As a result, 
terrorists would be classified as non-combatant civilians unless they are 
actively taking a direct part in hostilities.  However, such a “‘revolving door’ 
theory” seems imprudent, as it allows terrorists to remain civilians most of 
the time, only sacrificing their status—and hence only being liable to be 
attacked—when they actually carry out terrorist activities.30  Though the War 
on Terror is not a traditional war, this does not mean that the distinction 
between combatants and non-combatants should not be adhered to in a 
traditional sense. 
B. Terrorists Are Combatants 
The more sensible position, it would seem, would be to characterize 
terrorists as combatants.  Though they have no nation-state to legitimize 
their status, they nevertheless are taking part in a conflict that looks much 
like war.31  Rather than allow them the ability to only be liable to be attacked 
while taking part in attacks, it seems more likely that characterizing them as 
combatants would not allow them to circumvent the corresponding liability 
to attack that accords with combatant status.  Not allowing for combatant 
 
 26 HELEN FROWE, THE ETHICS OF WAR AND PEACE:  AN INTRODUCTION 103 (2011). 
 27 Kretzmer, supra note 3, at 171. 
 28 Whether this conflict is a non-international conflict, or more specifically, a non-
international armed conflict will be evaluated in Part V of this Comment. 
 29 Kretzmer, supra note 3, at 191–92. (explaining the arguments for treating al-Qaeda as 
non-citizens and citizens). 
 30 Id. at 193. 
 31 See, e.g., Jens David Ohlin, Targeting Co-belligerents, in TARGETED KILLINGS, supra note 8, at 
60, 82–83 (arguing that application of the continuous combat function standard to al-
Qaeda suggests “that these terrorists are trained to continuously operate as terrorists with 
the goal of pursuing attacks against the United States and its allies”). 
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characterization allows terrorists to enjoy the best of both worlds—not being 
liable to be attacked when not taking part in hostilities, but also being able 
to unjustly circumvent civilian status for a brief period of time in order to 
fight.32 
Though the War on Terror is not a traditional war, terrorists should be 
characterized as combatants.  They may not belong to a nation-state, but 
they still pose a danger in a manner similar to the danger posed by soldiers 
who attack as part of a country’s forces.  Al-Qaeda combatants would thereby 
be akin to the continuous combat function standard adopted by the 
International Commission of the Red Cross (“ICRC”).33  Whether labeled as 
mere combatants or given the label of a continuous combatant function, 
members of al-Qaeda are essentially continuously acting as terrorists, and 
hence opening themselves up to attack. 
1. Against Terrorists as Combatants? 
It nevertheless remains the case that some scholars argue that terrorists 
are indeed civilians.  The First Additional Protocol to the Geneva 
Conventions considers civilians to be “all persons who are not members of 
the armed forces,” but some scholars contend that in current conflicts 
“civilians do carry out various military related functions.”34  As civilians 
directly taking part in hostilities, terrorists would of course not be afforded 
the same protections as civilians that do not partake in fighting and pose no 
threat.  They take part in combat unlawfully and “may be tried if captured.”35  
 
 32 See., e.g. Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 4, at 269 (arguing that if a terrorist is not a 
combatant, “once he ceases his participation in the fighting he no longer presents any 
danger for the adversary and, having resumed his civilian status, should receive the 
protection accorded to civilians and cannot be targeted for an attack” (internal citations 
omitted)); Robert Kogod Goldman, International Humanitarian Law:  Americas Watch’s 
Experience in Monitoring Internal Armed Conflicts, 9 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 49, 66–67 
(1993) (“Consquently, all other persons not actively participating in the hostilities by 
intending to cause physical harm to enemy personnel or objects are considered part of 
the civilian population . . . . While taking a direct or active role in hostilities, these 
individuals forfeit their immunity from direct attack, but retain their status as civilians.  
Unlike combatants, once their participation ceases, these civilians may no longer be 
attacked, although they may be subject to trial and punishment by the adverse party for 
having assumed the role of a combatant.”); INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA 
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 1453 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987). 
 33 Cf. Jens David Ohlin, Targeting Co-belligerents, in TARGETED KILLINGS, supra note 8, at 60, 
82–85 (discussing the continuous combat function). 
 34 Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 4, at 269; see also Protocol additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of international 
armed conflicts (Protocol I) art. 50, Jan. 23, 1979, 1125 U.N.T.S. 17512 [hereinafter First 
Additional Protocol]. 
 35 Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 4, at 269. 
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Allowing terrorists the status of civilians not only protects them in the sense 
of the “revolving door” theory,36 but it also in a sense affords them fewer 
protections in that if they are captured they do not receive prisoner of war 
status.37  Though perhaps this would be just in the sense that they have given 
up their right to not be prosecuted by violating their civilian status, it instead 
seems more reasonable to deduce that they have given up their civilian 
status completely for the purpose of becoming combatants. 
Under the laws of war, to be lawfully targeted while not taking part in 
hostilities, the targeted individual must be a combatant.  This places the 
United States policy of targeted killing under scrutiny:  it seems that the 
United States does want its targets to be considered combatants when being 
targeted, as evidenced by the fact that often times targeted killing takes 
place when the target is not involved in hostilities.  The implication is that 
the United States must consider them to be combatants, assuming the 
United States wants to be justified in these killings.  This is also true in 
capture situations because the United States wants to detain those captured 
indefinitely as prisoners of war.  What the United States wants, however, is 
not the object of this Comment.  Rather, what just war theory and morality 
require is paramount, as the United States should act in a justified manner 
when taking part in targeted killing. 
Nor should this analysis change due to the fact that terrorists do not 
wear uniforms.  Uniforms, implemented in the post-Westphalian rise of 
sovereign nation-states, effectively serve as a “stamp of ownership” of a 
sovereign on his army.38  On one interpretation, the lack of a uniform can 
mean that an individual is not part of a collective;39 “[t]hat a group of 
soldiers wears uniforms might be external evidence of internal collective 
organization within a larger political community, and requirements of 
providing such evidence have clear instrumental value.”40  But construing 
status in this manner contains a major flaw.  Why may fighters only be able 
to assert a collective identity by wearing a uniform?  Though it is true that 
uniforms serve as a type of external evidence to the collective organization 
of a group, does not the brandishing of arms do the same thing?  Assuming 
 
 36 See, e.g., Kretzmer, supra note 3, at 193 (defining the “revolving door” theory as when 
terrorists remain civilians most of the time and only sacrifice their civilian status while 
actually carrying out terrorist activities). 
 37 See FROWE, supra note 26, at 101 (stating that there is a “great moral weight that rests 
upon the division between combatants and non-combatants” partially “because of the 
importance of according combatants prisoner of war (POW) status”). 
 38 Kutz, supra note 14, at 160–61. 
 39 Toni Pfanner, Military uniforms and the law of war, 86 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 93, 93–94 
(2004) (“The absence of a military uniform usually indicates that a person is a civilian, is 
therefore not allowed to perform military functions and must not be attacked.”). 
 40 Kutz, supra note 14, at 165. 
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that terrorists are indeed part of an organized group, taking part in 
hostilities should be enough to assert an outward demonstration of inclusion 
in this group.  Combatant status should not be dependent upon a mere 
piece of fabric.41 
2. The Morality Associated With Terrorists as Combatants 
Furthermore, inherent in the combatant versus non-combatant 
distinction is the morality associated with these groups, as it is sensible to 
accord the same morality to terrorists as combatants.  Terrorists, after all, are 
not members of a distinct nation-state and therefore are not compelled to 
fight for a country’s standing army.42  Rather, terrorists make the conscious 
choice to fight.  While there may be pressures within their society to 
participate, they are not brought into the ranks of terrorist organizations in 
an official manner like soldiers are brought to a country’s army.  Even if one 
made the argument that the War on Terror is a non-international conflict in 
which no prisoner of war status exists, and in which unlawful conduct has no 
bearing on status determinations, the organizational feature of terrorist 
groups may serve to confer combatant status and the associated morality that 
comes with this status. 
It is imperative to hold terrorists accountable for their actions, both 
morally and legally, by making them liable to be attacked.  Terrorists must 
be accorded combatant status so that they are liable to be killed; as members 
of an armed combatant group, they are legitimate targets.  Members of al-
Qaeda thereby are exculpated for their actions that accord with the rules of 
jus in bello,43 while at the same time they are correspondingly subject to a type 
of “reverse inculpation” in that they can then be killed.  In this analysis, 
making terrorists liable to be attacked seems to be the only way to truly hold 
them morally accountable for their actions.  Doing so allows them to keep 
their actions within the framework of jus in bello while making them 
continuously subject to attack. 
3. Terrorists, as Combatants, Are Liable to Be Attacked Whether or Not 
They Are Just 
Setting forth the argument that members of al-Qaeda and the Taliban 
are combatants morally liable to be attacked does not finish the analysis, 
 
 41 See id. at 179 (“That she wears no uniform is irrelevant to the collective aspect of her 
individual action; and it is the collective aspect that underwrites her privilege.  Assuming 
she has obeyed the laws of war, she ought to be impunible.”). 
 42 See, e.g., FROWE, supra note 26, at 190 (describing terrorists as “non-state actors”). 
 43 See Kutz, supra note 14, at 152–53 (asserting that compliance with the laws of war 
exculpates only acts by combatants). 
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however.  According to philosopher Jeff McMahan, al-Qaeda fighters should 
be considered truly unjust combatants, as they choose to go to war for an 
unjust cause.  In his view, “the criterion of liability to attack in war is moral 
responsibility for an objectively unjustified threat of harm.”44  Without the 
sovereignty of a nation-state, such groups seem to violate the rules of jus ad 
bellum while also violating the rules of jus in bello by disregarding certain 
norms through targeting civilians and ignoring the imminence and 
proportionality required by the laws of war.  As a result, in McMahan’s view, 
just combatants are able to target unjust combatants (in this example, 
terrorists), whereas unjust combatants may not target just combatants.45  In 
making this argument, McMahan essentially disregards the distinction 
between jus in bello and jus ad bellum; fewer wars will erupt, he believes, if 
there is no longer a distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello due to 
the proposition that more people will refuse to fight in unjust wars.46 
But the War on Terror seems to refute this conclusion.  Since al-Qaeda is 
not part of a nation-state in the traditional war sense, it does not compel 
people to take up arms against its enemies in the manner that a state could 
institute a draft.  Rather, al-Qaeda fighters choose to do so, as they have 
chosen to pick up their arms.  War should at least be restricted to the types 
of rules to which combatants on both sides—both just and unjust—need to 
adhere.  Given this example, it is arguably not within human nature to 
forego a cause in which someone believes simply because one may be taking 
part in a war that another side believes is unjust.47  McMahan’s goal 
circumvented, we should attempt to restrain war as much as we can by 
allowing jus in bello rights to both just and unjust combatants. 
Additionally, if only just combatants were morally allowed to take part in 
hostilities, this would leave unjust combatants open to attack with very 
limited justified means of protecting themselves.  As a consequence, unjust 
combatants would then be incentivized to violate the jus in bello principles 
and protect themselves via unjustified means.  Allowing jus in bello rights to 
unjust combatants gives them as much incentive as possible to exercise 
restraint and abide by just war principles.  That is, we want them to adhere 
to principles of jus in bello. 
 
 44 MCMAHAN, supra note 21, at 35. 
 45 Id. 
 46 See Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing in War, 114 ETHICS 693, 713–14 (2004); see also 
Richard V. Meyer, The Privilege of Belligerency and Formal Declarations of War, in TARGETED 
KILLINGS, supra note 8, at 183, 187–88 (discussing McMahan’s argument). 
 47 WALZER, supra note 13, at 39–40 (stating the underlying premise that while “[i]t 
might . . . be thought a matter of individual volition whether particular men join the army 
and participate in [a] war . . . [i]t takes courage to doubt” the justifications for the war, 
and “most men will be persuaded . . . to fight”). 
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This, however, is not promoted by McMahan’s view, which in fact may 
lead to morally justified soldiers obliterating unjust combatants.48  That is 
anything but morally just.  The distinction, therefore, should be between 
combatants and non-combatants, regardless of the justness of their causes in 
a jus ad bellum framework.  Terrorists should be given the right to assert 
combatant privileges—and to accept the corresponding risks—despite any 
injustice that accompanies their cause.  Since they are not part of a nation-
state, they are more likely unlawful combatants, but this does not change 
their rights in a jus in bello framework.  They may not be just in starting 
hostilities, but once the hostilities start, combatant status is warranted, along 
with its associated privileges and dangers. 
In terms of the United States and the practice of targeted killing in 
general, this analysis means that al-Qaeda terrorists may indeed be targeted 
under just war theory because they are combatants.49  This is an important 
distinction because otherwise the use of targeted killing would be overly 
permissive.  One must be a combatant to be subject to targeted killing. 
C. Status as Applied to Americans 
The question then remains whether an American citizen who becomes a 
part of a terrorist group and takes up arms against the United States is then 
liable to be eliminated by the United States via targeted killing.  It is true 
that International Humanitarian Law does not take citizenship into account 
when distinguishing civilian and combatant status.50  And it is also true that 
there was no duty to attempt to capture American citizens serving in the 
German army during World War II; having taken up arms against their 
country, they were liable to be attacked and hence killed.51  The Supreme 
Court unmistakably decided that an American citizen could be the subject of 
the laws of war when he takes up arms against the United States.52  Nor did 
the Court find that American citizenship provides exemption from actions 
 
 48 MCMAHAN, supra note 21, at 6 (setting forth McMahan’s novel argument “against the 
moral equality of combatants” via “the view that unjust combatants act permissibly when 
they fight within the constraints of the traditional rules of jus in bello”). 
 49 See, e.g., Detention of Enemy Combatants Act, H.R. 1076, 109th Cong. (2005) (“To 
authorize the President to detain an enemy combatant who is . . . a member of al Qaeda 
or knowingly cooperated with members of al Qaeda . . . .”); Lawrence Azubuike, Status of 
Taliban and Al Qaeda Soldiers:  Another Viewpoint, 19 CONN. J. INT’L L. 127, 152 (2003); Jeff 
McMahan, Targeted Killing:  Murder, Combat, or Law Enforcement?, in TARGETED KILLINGS, 
supra note 8, at 135, 143 (“[T]he Bush Administration claimed that terrorists are 
combatants . . . .”). 
 50 Radsan & Murphy, supra note 3, at 1238. 
 51 See id. (“In traditional conflicts, the United States has had citizens switch to the other side.  
Switched, they become targets just like foreign combatants.”). 
 52 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 45–46 (1942). 
934 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:3 
 
permitted by the laws of war.53  Americans can therefore be considered 
combatants against the United States. 
But it does not necessarily follow that because of this Americans may be 
the objects of targeted killing.  With at least three Americans citizens 
reportedly on the United States’ targeted killing list54—not including, of 
course, the already targeted al-Aulaqi—such an issue is more important than 
ever.  The final part of this Comment asserts that it is both immoral and 
illegal for the United States to take part in targeted killings against its own 
citizens, even if they are combatants.  In the intervening parts, the manner 
in which the United States can use targeted killings against anyone, whether 
American or not, under the laws of war and morality will be further refined. 
 
III.  STATUS CONTINUED:  THE PARTICIPATION OF THE CIA IN 
TARGETED KILLINGS PERPETRATED BY THE UNITED STATES 
First and foremost, the manner in which the United States engages in 
targeted killing must be the subject of critique.  If branches of the military 
were the sole perpetrators of targeted killing, there would be far fewer 
objections, as members of the armed forces are truly regarded as combatants 
under just war theory.55  A problem arises, however, when targeted killing is 
perpetrated outside of the military, mainly by the CIA. 
The use of CIA operatives began with a single strike in Pakistan in 2004, 
but has since increased.56  During President Obama’s tenure in office, he 
intensified the CIA’s drone program, carrying out more missile strikes inside 
Pakistan’s borders in his first year in office than George W. Bush authorized 
in his eight years as president.57  This effectively amounts to civilian 
participation in combat, which is prohibited by the 1977 Additional 
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions.58  In this view, CIA officers are not 
 
 53 See, e.g., Juragua Iron Co., Ltd. v. United States, 212 U.S. 297, 308–10 (1909) (“A neutral, 
or a citizen of the United States, domiciled in the enemy’s country . . . is deemed as much 
an alien enemy as a person actually born under the allegiance and residing within the 
dominions of the hostile nation.”); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635, 671, 674 (1862) 
(holding that citizens of the southern states during the Civil War could be blockaded or 
have their property confiscated according to the laws of war). 
 54 Dana Priest, U.S. playing a key role in Yemen attacks, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2010, at A1. 
 55 See, e.g., WALZER, supra note 13, at 36 (“Though there is no license [to kill] for war-
makers, there is a license [to kill] for soldiers, and they hold it without regard to which 
side they are on; it is the first and most important of their war rights.”). 
 56 Radsan & Murphy, supra note 3, at 1215–16. 
 57 Nicholas Schmidle, Getting Bin Laden, NEW YORKER, Aug. 8, 2011, at 35, 37. 
 58 See First Additional Protocol, supra note 34, at arts. 43, 51 (providing that “[m]embers of 
the armed forces of a Party to a conflict . . . are combatants, that is to say, they have the 
right to participate directly in hostilities” and “[c]ivilians shall 
enjoy . . . protection . . . unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities”).  
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lawful combatants under just war theory because they:  1) are not part of a 
military chain of command; 2) do not wear uniforms; and 3) are not trained 
in the laws of war.59  The question of distinction then becomes whether CIA 
agents who partake in targeted killing are granted combatant or civilian 
status. 
To be certain, there is a degree of overlap between the CIA and the 
military.60  Cooperation between the CIA and the Pentagon was particularly 
apparent in “Operation Neptune Spear,” the mission to kill Osama bin 
Laden.61  During the planning of this mission, the operation was essentially 
designed at CIA headquarters and authorized by the CIA; but the Navy 
conducted the mission itself.62  Regardless of this overlap, though, the CIA is 
not a formal part of the United States military.  It is a separate government 
entity.  In this sense, it must be recognized that CIA agents’ participation in 
the War on Terror is somewhat parallel to those they target in that they are 
not an official part of a higher military chain of command.  Neither CIA 
agents nor the terrorists they target are members of a military force of a 
nation-state.  In fact, it has been asserted by some that CIA agents are 
unlawful combatants.63  However, unlike those they target, CIA agents are 
members of a country that does have the ability to field an army.  As a result, 
can they really be all that similar? 
Even the United States is at times careful to distinguish the boundaries 
of CIA involvement, as the Air Force is responsible for targeted killing within 
the clear war zones of Afghanistan and Iraq, whereas the CIA controls 
targeted killing operations in northwest Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.64  
This Comment argues that this distinction cannot be mere coincidence:  
government officials surely recognize that CIA agents are not part of the 
armed forces and thus are not accorded all of the privileges of combatant 
status.65  If the CIA existed in a society where military command did not 
 
While the United States is not a signatory to the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions, the United States still considers the prohibition of civilian participation in 
combat as proscribed under customary international law, which is binding upon all 
nations.  Gary Solis, America’s unlawful combatants, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2010, at A17. 
 59 Radsan & Murphy, supra note 3, at 1206. 
 60 This is evidenced by the fact that Leon E. Panetta, the former Director of the CIA, is now 
the Secretary of Defense.  Leon E. Panetta: Secretary of Defense, U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, 
http://www.defense.gov/bios/biographydetail.aspx?biographyid=310 (last visited Oct. 2, 
2012). 
 61 For a scholarly narrative of CIA involvement in the killing of Osama bin Laden, see Kevin 
H. Govern, Operation Neptune Spear:  Was Killing bin Laden a Legitimate Military Objective?, in 
TARGETED KILLINGS, supra note 8, at 347, 352–53. 
 62 Schmidle, supra note 57, at 38. 
 63 Solis, supra note 58, at A17. 
 64 Radsan & Murphy, supra note 3, at 1202. 
 65 David Glazier, Playing by the Rules:  Combating Al Qaeda Within the Law of War, 51 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 957, 957, 1016 (2009) (setting forth the general premise, upon which the 
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exist, the result would be much different.  Al-Qaeda does not have the ability 
to set forth an army in the sense that the United States does.  So while al-
Qaeda fighters are accorded combatant status—albeit unlawful combatant 
status—the CIA is not.  The United States as a sovereign nation-state must be 
held to higher standards.  The United States sets itself forward as a leading 
nation, one whose democratic ideals should be followed by other countries 
throughout the world.  It must, then, hold itself to these high standards. 
But in some ways this distinction may not even matter.  Regardless of 
whether CIA agents are combatants or civilians, they open themselves up to 
attack.  CIA agents take part in hostilities and as such render themselves 
lawful targets.66  The importance of the distinction matters when taking into 
account the manner in which the CIA is permitted to take part in hostilities.  
Though the distinction may not be intuitive, it would seem the weight of 
evidence points towards their civilian status.  It was asserted above that the 
lack of uniforms for terrorists does not mean that they are necessarily 
civilians.  However, in the context of American involvement, the distinction 
may mean more since the United States actively chooses to allow a 
governmental entity aside from the military to take part in combat.  The U.S. 
could choose for the Air Force to carry out all targeted killing, but it does 
not.  Thus, not only does the United States decide to violate the laws of war 
by engaging the CIA, a branch that lacks uniforms or distinguishing insignia, 
in hostilities, but it also violates the laws of war by not allowing its distinct 
military branches to carry out these same hostilities.  In order for the United 
States to conduct targeted killings in accordance with the laws of war—and 
in a manner consistent with heightened morality—the CIA should not be 
associated with targeted killings. 
IV.  THE REQUIREMENTS OF IMMINENCE AND PROPORTIONALITY UNDER 
THE LAWS OF WAR 
In terms of just war theory, then, it is necessary to evaluate when the 
United States can in fact take part in targeted killing.  Under International 
Humanitarian Law, use of force in self-defense by a victim state must 
conform to the requirements of imminence and proportionality—and 
hence military necessity—in order to be just.67 
 
author expands, that members of al-Qaeda can be legally targeted by the military, but 
that the CIA’s role in targeting al-Qaeda “undermines the legality of these actions”). 
 66 Solis, supra note 58, at A17. 
 67 See FROWE, supra note 26, at 36–37, 53–54 (asserting that “[a] state can be said to have a 
just cause for war . . . if it is about to suffer an appropriate wrong” and “[i]n order for a 
war to be just, it must be a proportionate response”). 
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A.  Imminence 
The strict construction of imminence set forth by United States Secretary 
of State Daniel Webster in the nineteenth century may be a bit too 
constricting in that it requires that there be “‘a necessity of self-defence [that 
is] instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for 
deliberation.’”68  Rather than wait for the seconds before an attack occurs, 
imminence is satisfied in a looser sense if an attack is indeed planned and it 
will be carried out in a short period of time.69  The United States need not 
wait until a terrorist is about to detonate a bomb in order to act.  But, a 
terrorist must have a plan in mind and the ability to carry out an attack for 
his attack to be imminent and hence warrant a preemptive strike of self-
defense by the United States.  Moreover, a response by the United States 
must be necessary militarily in that use of force is “future-oriented, i.e., 
halting or repelling an attack”; for the United States’ response to be 
justified, another alternative option to force, such as capture, must not be 
available.70 
What this means in terms of targeted killing is perhaps not facially clear.  
Many terrorists that are the targets of drones are not actively involved in 
terrorist threats at the time they are killed.  They are going about the 
ordinary, daily business of their lives when a CIA operative sitting at Langley 
Air Force Base in McLean, Virginia detonates a drone and thereby kills 
them.71  Assuming that the person that is targeted is actually a member of a 
terrorist group like al-Qaeda or the Taliban, he is, as discussed above, a 
combatant and can be the object of attack.  But as to the imminence 
requirement, it seems that perhaps one cannot be targeted at any time 
whatsoever.  To be subject to attack, it is not enough for a terrorist to 
participate; he must be involved in the planning or carrying out of specific 
attacks on his enemy.  It is conceivable that one need not be on his way to 
detonate a bomb for the imminence requirement to be satisfied, but some 
 
 68 Kretzmer, supra note 3, at 179; see also WALZER, supra note 13, at 74 (citing Webster’s 
speech as to imminence in terms of pre-emptive violence). 
 69 WALZER, supra note 13, at 74. 
 70 Kretzmer, supra note 3, at 187–88; see also WALZER, supra note 13, at 74 (“Both individuals 
and states can rightfully defend themselves against violence that is imminent but not 
actual; they can fire the first shots if they know themselves about to be attacked.”); Dehn 
& Heller, supra note 5, at 177 (stating that al-Aulaqi’s father argued that “both the 
Constitution and international law prohibit targeted killing except as a last resort to 
protect against concrete, specific, and imminent threats of death or serious physical 
injury” (quoting Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Al-Aulaqi v. 
Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010) (Civil Action No. 10-1469))); Radsan & Murphy, 
supra note 3, at 1206 (asserting International Humanitarian Law “insists that military 
necessity justify all attacks:  an attack should reasonably be expected to create a concrete 
and direct military advantage”). 
 71 Solis, supra note 58, at A17. 
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type of outward participation in the planning of future hostilities must occur 
for the imminence requirement to be met.  This is true regardless of one’s 
citizenship under just war theory. 
The case becomes much more difficult when one has not taken up arms 
in a war, whether traditional or not.  In a traditional war, a state’s leader may 
potentially be the target of attack in that his existence makes further fighting 
abundantly more imminent.72  But what if one is merely the source of a 
cause’s rhetoric?  One’s words can spur a soldier to fight, but can these 
words really be considered the source of imminence?73  The difficulty of this 
question points towards a case-by-case assessment of one’s role in whatever 
war is taking place.  For instance, following this line of reasoning, if one is 
merely setting forth an argument for the superiority of one’s faith and the 
duty of its followers to spread its word, then imminence arguably would not 
be satisfied.  However, if one explicitly spurs someone to carry out acts of 
violent jihad, then imminence may indeed be satisfied.  But even then 
imminence must be explicit.  When one does not take up arms against an 
enemy and rather brandishes a pen, a significantly higher degree of 
imminence should be required to justify the targeting of an enemy. 
According to the United States, the imminence criterion can be satisfied 
when a person is found to be “the leader of a group that [seeks] to attack 
the United States whenever” given the opportunity, regardless of whether or 
not the person was involved in an attack when targeted.74  This is probably 
true.  Since terrorists are, as argued above, given combatant status, its 
leaders, as combatants, may also be targeted.  However, this criterion must 
actually be met.  In the case of Anwar al-Aulaqi, this was arguably not 
satisfied, at least according to information now available.  The United States 
deemed al-Aulaqi an imminent threat because he was a leader of AQAP.75  
All that has really been asserted, though, is that he was at most merely a 
propagandist and at the very least a Muslim cleric.76  While it is true that al-
Aulaqi was accused of playing more of “an operational role in [AQAP],”77 
there is no independent evidence of this other than the government’s word; 
 
 72 See Geoffrey Robertson, Is It Lawful to Kill Gaddafi?, DAILY BEAST (Mar. 31, 2011, 5:04 
AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/03/31/is-it-lawful-to-kill-gaddafi.html 
(arguing that under just war theory an enemy leader may be killed if there is “‘military 
necessity,’” but that “perfidious means such as spies or assassins” may not be used). 
 73 Anatol Rapoport, Introduction to CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR, 1, 11 (1967) (“[T]he 
nature of war is itself to a large extent determined by how man conceives of it.”); David 
Kennedy, Modern War and Modern Law, 36 U. BALT. L. REV. 173, 183 (2007) (“And 
communicating the war is fighting the war.”). 
 74 Cole, supra note 7. 
 75 Savage, Secret U.S. Memo, supra note 6, at A12. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
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any concrete evidence that the government might have of al-Aulaqi playing 
an active role has not been released.78  Though the cause of groups like al-
Qaeda and AQAP is necessarily bound up with religious beliefs, this does not 
mean that clerics should be considered leaders.  Would we ever want our 
own religious leaders targeted?  One would think not.  The interest of world 
stability, which is presumably implicated in such an analysis, should require 
more proof than sheer religious rhetoric; hence, imminence is not satisfied 
by mere propaganda that does not cross the line of telling one to fight, 
regardless of the propagandists’ citizenship. 
Al-Aulaqi was a propagandist, not a soldier,79 and thus did not present an 
imminent risk to the United States.  He was not found on a battlefield when 
he was killed.  Rather, he was in Yemen at the time of his death, far from the 
active battlegrounds of Afghanistan or Pakistan.80  It is true that in 
International Humanitarian Law it “is not the location of the attack, but the 
status of the attacker and target” that matter.81  While this functional—as 
opposed to territorial—view of just war theory must be taken into account, 
the proximity of a combatant to the battlefield perhaps directly corresponds 
to the imminence requirement.  Short of directing hostile attacks from afar, 
one cannot be deemed an imminent threat if one is not actively taking part 
in a threat.  On information now available, al-Aulaqi was arguably not such a 
leader. 
The legal memo drafted by the Obama Administration to justify 
targeting al-Aulaqi furthermore concluded that “what was reasonable, and 
the process that was due, was different for Mr. [al-Aulaqi] than for an 
ordinary criminal.”82  Such an argument brings forth a domestic analogy, in 
which al-Aulaqi’s life was being likened to that of a criminal in a law 
enforcement model.  Regarding imminence, it would seem that a law 
enforcement model for targeted killing would actually be less permissive 
than an analysis under the laws of war.  The law enforcement model of 
legality rests primarily on international human rights law standards, which 
have a type of reverence for life and thereby are necessarily more restrictive 
than the laws of war.83  Rather than citing imminence, the Model Penal Code 
in fact uses the term “immediately necessary” in terms of its imminence 
requirement.84  “Immediately necessary” inevitably falls on the more 
 
 78 Cole, supra note 7 (characterizing the claims against al-Aulaqi as “unofficial ‘allegations’ 
of encouragement”). 
 79 Savage, Secret U.S. Memo, supra note 6, at A12; Cole, supra note 7. 
 80 Savage, Secret U.S. Memo, supra note 6, at A1; Mary L. Dudziak, This War Is Not Over Yet, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2012, at A31. 
 81 Dehn & Heller, supra note 5, at 190. 
 82 Savage, Secret U.S. Memo, supra note 6, at A12 (reporting on the memo). 
 83 Kretzmer, supra note 3, at 174. 
 84 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(1) (1985). 
940 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:3 
 
restrictive end of the imminence scale.  Under this view, “use of force can 
never be regarded as necessary (let alone absolutely necessary) unless it is 
clear that there was no feasible possibility of protecting the prospective 
victim by apprehending the suspected perpetrator.”85  That is, one must use 
restraint and capture a suspect unless doing so would cause harm to a 
potential victim. 
In terms of targeted killing, this would translate to mean that one may 
use targeted killing against a terrorist in self-defense only if he serves as a 
threat that must be immediately guarded against and if capture is not feasible.  
Only then would targeted killing be warranted.  Though the laws of war and 
criminal law are somewhat analogous, the latter is much more limiting, and 
under its view targeted killing should not be used until the last possible 
moment.  Given the attributes of targeted killing, waiting until such a time is 
most likely not possible.  The law enforcement model hence does not 
inform the issue of targeted killing in a manner consistent with the Obama 
Administration’s use of it.  Its application is impractical. 
B. Proportionality 
In terms of proportionality, International Humanitarian Law 
furthermore requires that attacks may not result in “excessive ‘collateral 
damage.’”86  If the United States is to engage in targeted killing, then, the 
resulting destruction of killing a terrorist may not exceed the good that is 
gained by not allowing the terroristic act to proceed.  This raises the 
question of which life is more important:  the life of an enemy civilian, or 
the life of one’s own combatants.87  Although some argue that one’s own 
combatants’ lives are always worth more than an enemy civilian’s life,88 this is 
not an appropriate, moral balancing of lives.  Enemy civilians are considered 
unlawful targets under International Humanitarian Law.89  Targeted killing 
must be reasonably restricted to killing as few enemy civilians as possible; as 
 
 85 Kretzmer, supra note 3, at 179; cf. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 384, 386 (2007) (citing the 
proposition that deadly force is reasonable when one poses an “actual and imminent 
threat”); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985) (setting forth the idea that in criminal 
law preventive killing is impermissible except where there is probable cause to believe the 
suspect is dangerous to others). 
 86 Radsan & Murphy, supra note 3, at 1206. 
 87 There are four groups that are relevant to this analysis:  one’s own civilians, one’s own 
combatants, civilians in an enemy state (“enemy civilians”), and combatants from an 
enemy state (“enemy combatants”). 
 88 Asa Kasher & Amos Yadlin, Military Ethics of Fighting Terror:  An Israeli Perspective, 4 J. MIL. 
ETHICS 3, 18 (2005). 
 89 First Additional Protocol, supra note 34, at art. 50 (essentially defining civilians in the 
negative as all persons who are not combatants); WALZER, supra note 13, at 136 
(“‘Soldiers are made to be killed,’ as Napoleon once said . . . [N]o one else is made to be 
killed.”). 
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civilians, they have not opened themselves to attack and are thus not liable 
to be killed.  “The war convention rests . . . on a certain view of 
noncombatants, which holds that they are men and women with rights and 
that they cannot be used for some military purpose, even if it is a legitimate 
purpose.”90  This is not to say that one may not value one’s own civilians with 
higher priority than an enemy’s civilians.  However, this means that an 
enemy’s civilians should be prioritized over one’s own soldiers’ lives, as the 
latter have opened themselves up to attack while the former have not. 
A utilitarian argument can be made for the justification of the killing of 
some enemy civilians if the benefits of taking out a terrorist with some 
civilian collateral damage outweigh the risks to one’s own civilian population 
by not killing the terrorist.91  But in a non-traditional war, and without a 
specific situation presented, it would seem that it is prudent to argue for no 
civilian deaths.  The blurred state of affairs inherent in the War on Terror 
necessitates caution.  Proportionality, therefore, requires that in many cases 
one must attempt capture rather than targeted killing despite the added 
danger to one’s troops so as to reduce the possibility of civilian deaths. 
Regarding the domestic analogy, proportionality means that when 
targeted killing takes place, one must believe that not using force will result 
in the person being targeted “caus[ing] death or serious bodily injury.”92  
This limits targeted killing in that it must be believed that the person being 
targeted is involved in causing deadly force.  It is therefore not enough for 
one to simply be a driver or a cook for an enemy cause to be the object of 
targeted killing.  However, the law enforcement model also means that one 
must “believe[] that the force employed creates no substantial risk of injury to 
innocent persons.”93  Rather than limiting targeted killing, this in effect 
allows one to be exculpated for those innocent deaths that could not have 
been predicted.  It is true that it guards against innocents being explicitly 
targeted, but it implicitly accepts that there will be innocent casualties.  Such 
consequences should not be allowed.  If innocent lives become collateral 
damage, the associated consequences of violating the laws of war should be 
accepted.  Those that engage in targeted killing must be held responsible 
for the destruction they cause to innocents.94 
 
 90 WALZER, supra note 13, at 137. 
 91 For a description of such a utilitarian argument, see id. at 146 (arguing “[t]he relevant 
distinction is not between those who work for the war effort and those who do not, but 
between those who make what soldiers need to fight and those who make what they need 
to live, like all the rest of us.  When it is militarily necessary, workers in a tank factory can 
be attacked and killed, but not workers in a food processing plant”). 
 92 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(2)(b)(iv)(B) (1985). 
 93 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(2)(b)(iii) (1985) (emphasis added). 
 94 See, e.g., WALZER, supra note 13, at 136–37 (“[T]he law can be enforced even by criminal 
states against ‘policemen’ who deliberately kill innocent bystanders.  For these bystanders 
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Targeted killing, as all acts of war under just war theory, therefore must 
be constrained to the extent that engaging in targeted killing should not 
enable a disproportionate amount of force to be used against one’s 
enemies.95  In many cases, this may mean that capture is preferable to 
targeted killing.  Capture effectively takes one’s enemy off the battlefield, 
thereby circumventing any efforts he is involved in against the state that 
conducts the capture.  Capture would seem preferable to targeted killing in 
most instances, but the policy of targeted killing has been taken up by the 
United States, and the United States will most likely not turn back.  It should 
be ensured, then, that when targeted killing is conducted, that it satisfies the 
proportionality requirement. 
When the possibility of civilian death is apparent, proportionality is not 
satisfied.  Accordingly, in the War on Terror, it is not apparent that such 
proportionality is in fact met.  According to some accounts, as many as an 
average of fifty civilians are killed for every intended target.96  While this may 
be an overestimated figure,97 it remains that the United States calculates the 
number of civilian casualties resulting from its drone strikes using a method 
of calculation that brings into question both proportionality and morality.  
The procedure by which civilian casualties are calculated by the United 
States consists of including all military-age males killed in the strike zone as 
combatants, unless there is unambiguous intelligence to the contrary.98  
This, as one administration official has called it, is “‘guilt by association’ that 
has led to ‘deceptive’ estimates of civilian casualties.”99  Consequently, the 
United States can claim proportionality by willfully ignoring that innocents 
are being killed.  Such a procedure not only leads to a lack of 
proportionality, but it is also anything but moral. 
It is perhaps not easy to draw a line where too many civilians have been 
killed.  But though the line is difficult to draw, “that does not mean that no 
line should be drawn.”100  Morally, any civilian death is too much.  When 
even one civilian is killed while engaging in targeted killing, this is too much 
 
do not forfeit their rights when their states wrongly go to war.  An army warring against 
aggression . . . cannot violate the life and liberty of enemy civilians.”). 
 95 See WALZER, supra note 13, at 129 (“In the conduct of hostilities, it is not permissible to do 
‘any mischief which does not tend materially to the end [of victory], nor any mischief of 
which the conduciveness to the end is slight in comparison with the amount of the 
mischief.’” (quoting HENRY SIDGWICK, ELEMENTS OF POLITICS 254 (1891))). 
 96 Radsan & Murphy, supra note 3, at 1221. 
 97 Id. (characterizing the estimate of fifty civilians killed for every intended target as a 
“remarkable figure,” and suggesting by implication that this figure is overestimated). 
 98 Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 29, 2012, at A1. 
 99 Id. 
100 G.E.M. ANSCOMBE, Mr. Truman’s Degree, in 3 THE COLLECTED PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS OF 
G.E.M. ANSCOMBE 62, 67 (1981). 
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civilian death.  Again, a consequentialist argument would disagree and argue 
that one’s own civilians saved by a terrorist threat that has been avoided by 
engaging in targeted killing outweighs the civilian deaths of one’s 
enemies.101  Given that many of these threats also occur at a time when the 
factor of imminence is questionable, though, a questionable balancing of 
proportionality does not sway the decision. 
In Anwar al-Aulaqi’s situation, the United States decided that killing al-
Aulaqi was permissible if capture was not feasible.102  Even if it is accepted 
that targeting an American citizen is permissible, it was not so justified in 
this instance.  When al-Aulaqi was killed, so too was another American, 
Samir Khan.  Khan also never took up arms against the United States.103  The 
United States effectively killed its own civilian, a life that should be 
prioritized in the utmost regard.  When one’s own citizens could possibly 
become collateral damage, targeted killing is never warranted.  Perhaps the 
United States did not know that Khan was present when they targeted al-
Aulaqi, but that is not a defense to killing one’s own citizen.  Targeted 
killing should only take place in a situation where the certainty of safety for 
one’s own citizens is guaranteed.  That criterion was obviously violated when 
Khan was killed. 
V.  THE IMPORTANCE OF CONFLICT CHARACTERIZATION 
Building off of the previously discussed categories that inform the 
discussion of targeted killing, the characterization of the conflict itself is also 
important.  According to the Geneva Convention, a conflict is international 
when it is waged between two or more states.104  All other conflicts are 
necessarily non-international.105  Due to the lack of state boundaries in the 
latter type of conflicts, a “substantially higher threshold” must be met for an 
armed conflict to exist; this is so that it is possible to distinguish an armed 
conflict from acts of short and unorganized insurrections, banditry, and 
 
101 An example of such balancing can be seen in the World War II bombing of Hiroshima.  
American leaders effectively made the decision that the bombing “would save lives where 
the lives counted [were] the lives of American soldiers.  The lives of Japanese, military or 
civilian, presumably counted for less.”  JOHN RAWLS, Fifty Years after Hiroshima, in 
COLLECTED PAPERS 565, 570 (Samuel Freeman ed., 1999) (explaining that a utilitarian 
seeks to promote overall utility, which involves a calculation of net utility, rather than 
promote or protect the rights of individuals). 
102 Cole, supra note 7. 
103 Savage, Secret U.S. Memo, supra note 6. 
104 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 2, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516. 
105 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 3, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516. 
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even in some cases, terrorist activities.106  Terrorist activities may therefore 
sometimes be characterized as unarmed conflicts, especially when such 
aggression is intermittent. 
When an unarmed conflict exists, states are restricted in their resort to 
force.107  This Comment argues that targeted killing should not be permitted 
in these instances; an armed conflict, whether it is international or not, must 
exist for the threshold issue of targeted killing to be permitted.  This is true 
regardless of the citizenship of the person targeted.  If a war does not exist, 
traditional or not, targeted killing should not occur.  A terrorist in an 
unarmed conflict does open himself up to attack when actively carrying out 
hostilities, but then capture must occur after this stage.108  For instance, 
Timothy McVeigh, having bombed the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in 
Oklahoma City,109 could not be the object of targeted killing after the 
bombing took place; short of a standoff between himself and police, it would 
be necessary to capture him.  This would be true whether or not he was an 
American citizen.  In an armed conflict, though, targeted killing may be 
permitted, as the rules of jus in bello apply in an armed conflict;110 the 
applicability of just war theory to such a conflict may warrant the targeting of 
one’s enemies that pose an imminent risk. 
A. The War on Terror Is a Non-International Armed Conflict 
According to the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (“AUMF”) 
and various Supreme Court decisions, the conflict with al-Qaeda is a non-
international armed conflict.111  However, some scholars criticize this 
characterization as an overly permissive classification.112  To them, the War 
on Terror amounts to “sporadic acts of terrorism” not amounting to a non-
international armed conflict; they argue that only International 
 
106 Ben-Naftali & Michaeli, supra note 4, at 257. 
107 Stephen C. Neff, Towards a Law of Unarmed Conflict:  A Proposal for a New International Law 
of Hostility, 28 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 5, 28 (1995). 
108 In many cases of unarmed conflict this point is probably moot as many terrorists kill 
themselves when carrying out terrorist plots. 
109 Dale Russakoff & Serge F. Kovaleski, An Ordinary Boy’s Extraordinary Rage, WASH. POST, 
July 2, 1995, at A1. 
110 See Kretzmer, supra note 3, at 186 (defining jus in bello as International Humanitarian Law 
that governs parties in an armed conflict). 
111 See 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630 (2006) (explaining 
that the conflict with al-Qaeda is not a conflict of an “‘international character’”); Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 526–27 (2004).  See also Dehn & Heller, supra note 5, at 190 
(arguing that “whatever the substantive international law on the subject, the AUMF and 
Supreme Court decisions interpreting it have established in U.S. law the existence of an 
armed conflict and the authority to exercise belligerent powers—such as armed attacks 
and preventive detentions”). 
112 See id. at 190. 
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Humanitarian Law scholars of American nationality truly believe that the 
War on Terror is an armed conflict.113  But characterizing the War on Terror 
as a non-international unarmed conflict neglects the fact that this conflict 
has been ongoing for more than a decade.  Though fighting may not occur 
on a regular basis, it is anything but sporadic.114  The War on Terror has 
consisted of continuous fighting.  And it is not just the United States that 
sanctions such a categorization.  When other members of the United 
Nations take part in the War on Terror, they too implicitly agree with the 
portrayal of the War on Terror as an armed conflict.  Consequently, the War 
on Terror should be classified as a non-international armed conflict.115 
The question then remains as to what groups exactly are a part of this 
non-international armed conflict.  The AUMF provides the legal 
authorization for the use of force against those groups that “planned, 
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11, 2001”; under the AUMF those groups are in conflict with the 
United States.116  It follows that the members of the groups implicitly listed 
by the AUMF, namely al-Qaeda and the Taliban, receive combatant status 
and may be on the receiving end of force employed by the United States.  So 
long as a member of al-Qaeda or the Taliban presents an imminent threat, 
and targeted killing is deemed proportionate, targeted killing may be 
utilized.  Though this analysis seems relatively straightforward, in practice it 
may not be so simple, as some groups against which the United States 
employs targeted killing are not covered by the AUMF and therefore may 
not be targeted. 
B. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Is Not a Part of the Non-International 
Armed Conflict that Exists Under the AUMF 
For instance, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (“AQAP”) cannot be 
sufficiently characterized as a member of al-Qaeda in the sense required for 
it to be the target of U.S. animosity.  Given the use of force against members 
of AQAP, it is apparent that the United States government does not agree 
with this assertion.  It deems AQAP a co-belligerent with al-Qaeda.117  
 
113 Id. at 197. 
114 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001); 
Claudette Roulo, Panetta:  Nation Faces ‘Dangerous and Unpredictable’ World, U.S. DEP’T OF 
DEF. (Oct. 19, 2012), http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=118273.  
115 This conclusion is consistent with Dehn & Heller, supra note 5, at 190. 
116 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004). 
117 See, e.g., Dehn & Heller, supra note 5, at 190 (suggesting that “the Government argue[s] 
that AQAP is either part of al-Qaeda, or is an associated force, or cobelligerent, of al-
Qaeda that has directed attacks against the United States” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
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Consequently, government officials would assert that AQAP is a force 
associated with al-Qaeda and is thus part of the armed conflict between the 
United States and al-Qaeda.118 
Despite such assertions by the United States government, there is a basis 
in just war theory for rejecting AQAP as a part of the conflict that is the War 
on Terror.  There is no customary rule in just war theory that allows co-
belligerency to apply to non-state actors in a non-international armed 
conflict.119  It must be asserted that AQAP is a distinct organization from al-
Qaeda, and hence is not a target that the United States may consider as 
covered by the AUMF.  Consequently, the AUMF does not cover hostilities 
against AQAP:  AQAP is an organization founded in Yemen, long after the 
attacks of September 11, 2001 that prompted the issuance of the AUMF.120  
Just war theory should limit the interpretation of the AUMF, not merely 
inform it.121 
Moreover, due to the fact that co-belligerency is not permitted in non-
international conflicts, it is also pertinent that al-Qaeda is not organized at a 
global level to a sufficient extent for the two groups to be considered one 
organization.122  It is simply not enough to say that AQAP is an enemy on par 
with al-Qaeda because the United States says so; the groups must be 
sufficiently organized so as to warrant singular status in order for AQAP to 
truly be a part of the armed conflict with the United States.  In the case of al-
Qaeda and AQAP, that requirement arguably has not been met.  They may 
share a common goal, but their interconnections stop there.  Al-Qaeda and 
AQAP are separate entities with separate leadership.  Furthermore, “the 
‘combat’ [between the United States and AQAP] is not even close to being 
sufficiently protracted or intense” to be characterized as a non-international 
armed conflict.123  Hostilities between the United States and AQAP are too 
 
118 Id. 
119 Conversely, in a more traditional war, co-belligerency among state actors is recognized.  
The problem arises in this case due to the non-international nature of the hostilities.  See 
Dehn & Heller, supra note 5, at 200 (arguing that one “reason[] why cobelligerency does 
not apply to nonstate actors in [non-international armed conflicts]” is due to the fact that 
there is a “complete absence of state practice . . . supporting the existence of such a 
customary rule”). 
120 Cole, supra note 7. 
121 Dehn & Heller, supra note 5, at 200–01 (“It is no accident that the United States claims 
the interpretation of the AUMF is ‘informed’ by the laws of war, not limited by them. . . . 
If IHL limited the AUMF, the government would not be able to maintain either the 
fiction that the United States is involved in a global [non-international armed conflict] 
with al-Qaeda or the fiction that cobelligerency applies to nonstate actors in [non-
international armed conflicts].  And without those fictions, the government would find it 
much more difficult to justify its position that the laws of war entitle it to kill [a]l-
Aulaqi.”). 
122 Id. at 198. 
123 Id. at 183. 
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intermittent.  The United States may still assert force against AQAP to 
defend itself, but the United States is more constrained in its ability to target 
AQAP because an armed conflict does not exist.  Targeted killing is only 
warranted when an armed conflict exists. 
In the case of Anwar al-Aulaqi, then, he was not adequately associated 
with the specific non-international armed conflicts in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan for targeted killing to be allowed.124  The targeted killing of al-
Aulaqi did not take place in the context of an armed conflict.  Moreover, 
lethal force was not warranted, as it was not absolutely necessary.  He was not 
part of a non-international armed conflict with the United States because he 
was not even alleged to be a part of the Taliban or al-Qaeda, the two groups 
Congress has authorized force against under the AUMF.125  He was not a 
combatant against which targeted killing should have been used, regardless 
of his citizenship. 
VI.  THE RIGHTS OF AMERICAN CITIZENS:  WHEN TARGETED KILLING IS 
TURNED ON OUR OWN 
What, then, should occur when an American is targeted?  Despite the 
prudence of distinguishing citizens from non-citizens, according to some 
scholars there is not a problem with using targeted killing against American 
citizens per se.126  These scholars assert that the United States government 
has just as much standing to kill Americans as it does non-Americans, which 
is to say that due process must be satisfied in both cases.  The problem, in 
this view, is not that an American is killed, but that the missiles could be 
fired inaccurately or without justification, resulting in death for individuals 
who were not meant to be targeted.127  This could not be further from the 
truth, as historically the United States has indeed taken into account one’s 
 
124 The United States reportedly used many of the arguments set forth in the prior 
paragraph to assert its right to target al-Aulaqi.  Cf. Cole, supra note 7 (describing the 
government’s position on al-Aulaqi as “the leader of AQAP, which it deemed a ‘co-
belligerent,’ effectively fighting alongside al-Qaeda itself”); Savage, Secret U.S. Memo, supra 
note 6, at A12 (setting forth the government’s argument that the AUMF covered al-
Aulaqi’s killing, thereby making him “a lawful target in the armed conflict”); Dehn & 
Heller, supra note 5, at 178 (characterizing the clash with AQAP as “a congressionally 
authorized, armed conflict”). 
125 Cole, supra note 7. 
126 See Radsan & Murphy, supra note 3, at 1238 (“[M]orally speaking . . . the U.S. government 
has just as much standing to kill Americans as non-Americans.”); Murphy & Radsan, supra 
note 2, at 405 (“[U]nder Boumediene, the executive has a due process obligation to 
develop fair, rational procedures for its use of targeted killing no matter whom it might 
be targeting anywhere in the world.”). 
127 Radsan & Murphy, supra note 3, at 1207. 
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citizenship when administering justice against Americans who have turned 
against our country. 
A. The History of Due Process Towards American Traitors 
The Constitution itself provides for the possibility that Americans will 
turn against their own government.  The Constitution states in relevant part: 
Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War 
against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and 
Comfort.  No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the 
Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in 
open Court. 
The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, 
but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or 
Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.128 
An American citizen does not receive fewer rights under the Treason Clause; 
the Constitution explicitly provides for guarantees of a citizen’s rights in 
those instances in which treason, as clearly defined in this subsection, 
occurs.  Those citizens who levy war against the United States are thereby 
“entitled to specific procedural protections,” namely the requirements that 
there must be at least two witnesses against the accused traitor as well as 
prosecution before an Article III court.129  The requirements explicitly laid 
out in the Constitution do not allow for military authority—such as the 
decision to use targeted killing—against one’s own citizens who have 
committed treason.130 
However, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Ex parte Quirin, in which 
the Court approved a military trial and execution of an American citizen 
who aided Nazi Germany, the law essentially changed.  Since that time the 
Court has failed to recognize a distinction between those subject to treason, 
and hence granted due process within the criminal justice system, and those 
subject to military authority as enemies of the United States.131  Regardless of 
this modification to the traditional rule of treason, the fact that it is 
contained within the Constitution is informative in itself.  Its inclusion 
provides a strong argument for those people who engage in acts of war or 
aid the enemy to keep their rights that they have by virtue of being 
American citizens. 
 
128 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3. 
129 Carlton F.W. Larson, The Forgotten Constitutional Law of Treason and the Enemy Combatant 
Problem, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 863, 865 (2006). 
130 Id. at 863. 
131 See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942) (granting unlawful combatants a right to trial 
and punishment by military tribunal); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518–20 
(2004) (upholding the Quirin decision). 
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Inherent in the Supreme Court’s decision in Ex parte Quirin is the idea 
that citizens will receive some sort of process under military authority.132  But 
this is not what happens with targeted killing.  When the United States 
engages in targeted killing, the person who is targeted is, as argued below, 
killed without sufficient due process.  As evidenced by the inclusion of the 
Treason Clause in the Constitution, the War on Terror is clearly not the first 
time that an American citizen has betrayed the United States.133  The 
Constitution ensures the rights of Americans whether they are loyal or not. 
B. Due Process:  The Rights of Americans To Not Be the Objects of Targeted 
Killing 
In order to evaluate the rights of American citizens within the War on 
Terror it is necessary to ask what an American citizen’s protections would be 
if he were indeed a part of al-Qaeda.  The case of Anwar al-Aulaqi is still 
informative on this discussion, as the United States effectively granted him 
the same status that it would have granted an American member of al-
Qaeda.  This is due to the fact that the United States deems AQAP a co-
belligerent of al-Qaeda that is a combatant under the AUMF.  For the 
purpose of this argument, several assumptions will be made.  First, the 
argument assumes that al-Aulaqi was indeed a lawful combatant involved 
with al-Qaeda in the armed conflict against the United States.  After all, that 
is precisely what lawyers in the Obama Administration claimed when they 
wrote a memo justifying the killing of al-Aulaqi.134  Second, the argument 
assumes that the CIA does not partake in targeted killing so as to cure any 
issues regarding their status under the laws of war.135 
1.  Justifying the Targeted Killing of Americans:  The Secret Office of Legal 
Counsel Memo 
The memo justifying the targeting of al-Aulaqi, which has yet to be 
released, measures roughly fifty pages in length, and was principally drafted 
by two lawyers in the Obama Administration’s Office of Legal Counsel 
(“OLC”), David Barron and Martin Lederman.  Completed in June 2010, 
 
132 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 44 (“Since the Amendments, like § 2 of Article III, do not 
preclude all trials of offenses against the law of war by military commission without a jury 
when the offenders are aliens not members of our Armed Forces, it is plain that they 
present no greater obstacle to the trial in like manner of citizen enemies who have 
violated the law of war applicable to enemies.”). 
133 Note that treason charges have been brought approximately thirty times since the passing 
of the Constitution.  Douglas A. Kash, The United States v. Adam Gadahn:  A Case for 
Treason, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2008). 
134 Justifying the Killing of an American, supra note 11, at A22. 
135 See supra Part III. 
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the memo was supposedly narrowly drawn to the specifics of al-Aulaqi’s case, 
finding that targeting al-Aulaqi would be lawful only if capture were not 
feasible.136  The memorandum sets out the legal analysis for the targeted 
killing of al-Aulaqi but neglects to “independently analyze the quality of the 
evidence against him.”137 
The memo reportedly argues that the imminence criterion is satisfied if 
a target is a leader of a group in conflict with the United States that attempts 
to attack the United States whenever it gets the chance, regardless of 
whether or not the leader is involved in any such attacks when he is 
targeted.138  According to this analysis, when the imminence requirement is 
met, a trial is not warranted.139  As is argued in the imminence section above, 
such analysis may in fact be true.  A leader of a group fighting the United 
States opens himself up to harm by taking part in hostilities.  However, this is 
not the case when the target is an American citizen.  Targeted killing is 
much different than a case in which an American is killed on the battlefield 
of a traditional war.  Under the laws of war, one is not required to capture 
an American citizen and provide a jury trial and Supreme Court review if he 
is found carrying a gun on the battlefield against the United States.  “[I]t is 
not necessarily illegal, in wartime, to kill a citizen without a trial.  Lincoln’s 
Union Army did it repeatedly, of course, during the Civil War.”140 
It must be remembered that targeted killing is the  “premeditated killing 
by a state of a specifically identified person not in its custody.”141  
Premeditation makes all the difference when a country targets its own 
citizens in such a manner.  The issue, then, is perhaps not that an American 
citizen is killed, as that could happen in the course of a traditional war in 
which an American takes up arms against the United States.  The problem 
arises when one is expressly targeted with such premeditated intent.142  As a 
United States citizen, al-Aulaqi—and any American who becomes the object 
of targeted killing carried out by the United States—was entitled to more 
due process simply by virtue of his citizenship and the corresponding rights 
provided by the Constitution.  President Obama, in reference to his decision 
 
136 See Savage, Secret U.S. Memo, supra note 6, at A1 (“The Obama administration’s secret legal 
memorandum that opened the door to the killing of Anwar al-[Aulaqi] . . . found that it 
would be lawful only if it were not feasible to take him alive . . . .”). 
137 Id. at A12. 
138 See Cole, supra note 7 (reporting on the content of the Obama Administration’s secret 
legal memorandum regarding the killing of Anwar al-Aulaqi). 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
141 Murphy & Radsan, supra note 2, at 406. 
142 It could be argued that this point is contradicted by the Civil War, since during this 
conflict the United States certainly knew United States citizens were being killed.  
However, the Civil War was an internal conflict, and so it is a sort of anomaly that does not 
disprove the theory presented. 
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to target al-Aulaqi, told colleagues that the decision was “‘an easy one.’”143  It 
should be anything but easy to deliberately decide to kill one’s own citizen. 
It has been reported that the secret legal memorandum justifying the 
killing of al-Aulaqi relied upon an executive ban against assassinations, a 
federal law against murder, and the protections of the Bill of Rights, as well 
as the laws of war.144  The former two are perhaps less informative during 
war, however, due to the nature of war itself.  This is because if one is 
fighting a war, it is not murder to kill an enemy combatant.  Nor is it 
assassination if one kills a leader who has opened himself up to attack by 
partaking in a war.145  These prohibitions must yield to the latter points of 
the Constitution and International Humanitarian Law.  As previously 
mentioned, International Humanitarian Law does not take citizenship into 
account, so the only possible basis for evaluating the targeting of an 
American citizen is the Constitution itself, particularly the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.146  If due process analysis is warranted when 
detention is used in the War on Terror, then it is certainly warranted in 
targeted killing.147  The Obama memorandum supposedly cites various cases 
that allow the government to detain or try in military court Americans who 
join enemy forces in order to justify targeted killing.148  There is a large 
difference, however, between detention and loss of life. 
According to leaked descriptions of the memorandum, joining an enemy 
force effectively deprived al-Aulaqi of a citizen’s due process rights, as the 
protection of innocent lives should be weighed to a greater extent than the 
possible death of a suspect.149  Such a utilitarian argument, while valid, 
nevertheless goes against the basic rights granted by the Constitution.  The 
Constitution does not say that one’s life can be deprived if others will be 
 
143 See Becker & Shane, supra note 98, at A10. 
144 See Savage, Secret U.S. Memo, supra note 6, at A12 (detailing the Justice Department’s 
rejection of potential legal prohibitions on killing al-Aulaqi).  The ban on assassinations, 
promulgated by President Reagan in response to alleged abuses by intelligence agencies, 
appears in Exec. Order No. 12333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,952 (Dec. 8, 1981), while the 
prohibition of murder is codified in 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (2006). 
145 See Andrew Altman & Christopher Heath Wellman, From Humanitarian Intervention to 
Assassination:  Human Rights and Political Violence, 118 ETHICS 228, 253 (2008) (“Surely, it 
would have been permissible for someone to have assassinated Stalin in the 1930s.”).  See 
generally Radsan & Murphy, supra note 3, at 1231 (characterizing targeted killings as 
“[coming] close to prohibited acts of assassination”). 
146 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . . .”). 
147 See Murphy & Radsan, supra note 2, at 409–10 (arguing that the Fifth Amendment’s due 
process rights are controlling in determining the legality of targeted killings of suspected 
terrorists). 
148 See Savage, Secret U.S. Memo, supra note 6, at A12 (reporting on the memorandum’s 
purported interpretation of what constitutes due process for al-Aulaqi). 
149 Justifying the Killing of an American, supra note 11, at A22. 
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saved.  Rather, one may not be “deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law.”150  There is no balancing present.  And while some may 
think it would be the moral decision to save the innocent lives that hang in 
the balance, is it not also moral to give credence to one’s constitutional 
rights?  Especially with regard to the manner in which targeted killing is 
carried out, it is furthermore difficult to make such a balance in any case.  
No one can tell how many lives are in the balance, and thus the United 
States should value the lives of its own citizens that are targeted, rather than 
the hypothetical ones that may be put at risk via terrorist attack. 
Moreover, if joining an enemy force causes one to be deprived of due 
process rights, as the memo supposedly asserts,151 then a long line of 
Supreme Court cases must be overturned.  Even enemies are sometimes 
afforded rights under the Constitution during times of war.  The Supreme 
Court decided that U.S. laws extend throughout United States territory, 
including Guantanamo Bay,152 and that this is true even for non-citizen 
detainees.153  If even non-citizen detainees in the War on Terror are 
guaranteed the right of due process inherent in the writ of habeas corpus, 
then surely United States citizens must be guaranteed due process rights as 
well.154  American citizens are guaranteed the right to due process 
throughout the world.155  “The point is straightforward:  the Due Process 
Clause provides that certain substantive rights—life, liberty, and property—
cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate 
procedures.”156  Due process, therefore, must apply even to American 
citizens who take part in non-international armed conflicts against the 
United States. 
2. Counterarguments Against Due Process 
Those who disagree with such an assertion regarding the rights held by 
an American acting against the United States could argue that, especially in 
al-Aulaqi’s case, his American citizenship is nothing more than an accident 
 
150 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
151 See Savage, Secret U.S. Memo, supra note 6, at A1 (noting that the memo’s analysis relied, in 
part, on al-Aulaqi’s support of al Qaeda, an enemy force). 
152 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004). 
153 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2262 (2008) (holding that even non-citizens are 
“entitled to the privilege of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of their detention”). 
154 Cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (holding that “due process demands 
that a citizen held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful 
opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention before a neutral 
decisionmaker”). 
155 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957) (noting that the Bill of Rights constrains the 
actions of the government even against citizens abroad). 
156 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985). 
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of birth.  He had no control whatsoever over where he was born, and he had 
no loyalty or allegiance to the United States.  Under this view, it is perhaps 
unfair to grant al-Aulaqi the further due process rights accorded to 
American citizens for no other reason than he happened to be born on 
American soil. 
But a counterargument in this vein runs contrary to the very principles 
inherent in American citizenship.  If al-Aulaqi were not afforded the same 
rights as other American citizens, there could potentially be nothing to stop 
the United States government from taking these rights away from other 
citizens as well.  As unfair as it may seem to some, allowing al-Aulaqi all of 
the rights of an American citizen—even despite the fact that his citizenship 
could be a mere accident of birth—is the best way to ensure these rights for 
all Americans.  A person is a United States citizen by virtue of being born on 
American soil.157  If further conditions were required to receive citizenship, 
there is no telling how the government would do so.  Making exceptions for 
al-Aulaqi to be deprived of his citizenship could lead to a slippery slope 
whereby Americans are deprived of their rights as United States citizens, 
perhaps sometimes for reasons just as seemingly trivial as an accident of 
birth.  When the rights of American citizens hang in the balance, caution 
should be used to protect these rights. 
Additionally, under contractarianism, citizens of the United States 
subject themselves to the rights and protections of the United States 
government.158  However, via such acts as treason or rebellion, some may 
argue that it is possible for a citizen to break such a contract.  As a result, it 
would be permissible for the United States to engage in targeted killing to 
kill one of its own citizens, provided that the citizen has effectively rejected 
his “contract” with America.  But, is it even possible for a citizen to give up 
such rights?  Short of openly denouncing one’s citizenship and breaking all 
ties with the United States, it is not possible to simply lose one’s rights as a 
United States citizen.  And even then it may not be possible.  American 
citizens, no matter where they are located, are necessarily entitled to the 
considerations of due process by virtue of their citizenship.159  One cannot 
break this tie.  In terms of targeted killing, due process can never be 
 
157 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (2006) (“The following shall be nationals and citizens of the United 
States at birth:  (a) a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof . . . .”). 
158 See Michael Walzer, contract, social, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 164 (Ted 
Honderich ed., 1995) (detailing that under contract theory “political society is a human 
construct”). 
159 See Reid, 354 U.S. at 5; see also Murphy & Radsan, supra note 2, at 435 (arguing that “[t]he 
relationship between Boumediene and Mathews suggests that the Due Process Clause 
applies . . . to government action worldwide”). 
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satisfied, and hence it is never permissible for the United States to kill one of 
its own American citizens via targeted killing. 
3. Due Process for American Citizens 
So what, then, does due process entail?  It is true that one must not 
capture a United States citizen and give him a jury trial and Supreme Court 
review if he is found carrying a gun on the battlefield against the United 
States; he would then be subject to force immediately, as he poses an 
imminent threat in war.160  In terms of targeted killing, where a citizen is not 
explicitly found in a battlefield situation, due process seems to require more 
than a military risk analysis.161  To some, this means allowing a targeted 
killing decision to be the subject of review before an Article III judge prior 
to it being carried out.162  To others, even a “post-deprivation procedure” 
like that in North American Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, may be enough, 
allowing one to challenge the legality of a targeted killing after the death has 
occurred.163  The latter suggestion clearly has more problems than the 
former, as challenging the deprivation of one’s life after the fact is mere 
show; there could obviously be no remedy for the victim if the killing is 
found to be unwarranted.164 
Given the constantly changing circumstances in the War on Terror, even 
the former could not be enough, as it would be akin to putting someone on 
trial for murder without being given the opportunity to defend oneself.  The 
 
160 See Michael Bahar, As Necessity Creates the Rule:  Eisentrager, Boumediene, and the Enemy—
How Strategic Realities Can Constitutionally Require Greater Rights for Detainees in the Wars of the 
Twenty-First Century, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 277, 300, 324 (2009). 
161 Justifying the Killing of an American, supra note 11, at A22. 
162 Lindsay Kwoka, Comment, Trial by Sniper:  The Legality of Targeted Killing in the War on 
Terror, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 301, 303 (2011) (proposing that the President’s decision “to 
target a citizen for death should be reviewed in a private hearing before an Article III 
judge before the killing is carried out”). 
163 211 U.S. 306 (1908). See Murphy & Radsan, supra note 2, at 410–13 (arguing that just as 
Supreme Court precedents allow a due process right to judicial review after 
imprisonment for alleged terrorists, a form of judicial review may analogously be 
appropriate after an attack). 
164 This, in a sense, is exactly the type of justice currently being sought by the families of al-
Aulaqi, his son Abdulrahman, and Samir Khan.  In al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, their families are 
challenging the targeted killing of these three American citizens as violating the 
Constitution’s guarantee against the deprivation of life without due process of law.  The 
complaint, which seeks unspecified damages, was filed against four senior national 
security officials, including Secretary of Defense Leon C. Panetta, former CIA Director 
David H. Petraeus, and two senior commanders of the Special Operations Command of 
the military, Admiral William H. McRaven of the Navy and Lieutenant General Joseph 
Votel of the Army.  The complaint specifically alleges a violation of the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments as well as the Bill of Attainder Clause of the United States Constitution.  
Complaint at 15–16, Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, No. 1:12-cv-01192-RMC (D.D.C. July, 18, 2012). 
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OLC memorandum justifying the targeted killing of al-Aulaqi reportedly 
offers such “due process,” as it asserts that the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee 
of due process can be satisfied via the internal deliberation of the executive 
branch.165  As Attorney General Eric Holder once put it, “‘[d]ue process’ 
and ‘judicial process’ ‘are not one and the same, particularly when it comes 
to national security.’”166  The Sixth Amendment, however, grants citizens the 
right to confront their accusers and to set forth witnesses in their favor;167 
none of this is possible in terms of targeted killing.  The ad hoc 
decisionmaking of the executive branch or of an Article III judge does not 
allow one to confront one’s accusers.  Moreover, if one were to present 
oneself for such a trial, one would be detained indefinitely as a prisoner of 
war.  “[T]he idea that an American citizen should be forced to choose 
between death and potentially indefinite detention simply because the 
executive has decided she is a terrorist hardly seems consistent with any 
coherent notion of citizenship.”168 
Even if the United States were to set forth criterion in which it clearly 
and publicly states for what actions a citizen would be subject to targeted 
killing, this would not be enough.  Each individual citizen has a right to 
defend oneself against charges that would render a citizen subject to 
targeted killing.169  This, again, does not mean that an American citizen 
cannot be targeted on the battlefield.  It does mean, though, that there is a 
major difference between the premeditation involved in targeted killing and 
the perchance death of an American on a battlefield.  Due process against 
United States citizens in terms of targeted killing can never reach a level of 
acceptability; no amount of due process can justify targeted killing. 
Rather than provide for executive or judicial review of a decision to 
utilize targeted killing—which does not allow one to confront his accusers—
or to require a citizen to surrender—which would be highly impractical—
the only option is to capture American citizens or to kill them in the heat of 
battle according to traditional laws of war.  It can be argued that detaining 
American citizens can lead to problems of its own, such as indefinite 
detention, regardless of whether or not the Supreme Court has invalidated 
 
165 Becker & Shane, supra note 98, at A1.  Note that the weekly counterterrorism meetings at 
the White House in which security officials discuss the latest developments regarding 
those on the kill list are known derisively amongst some as “‘Terror Tuesday’ meetings.”  
Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 29, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-
in-war-on-al-qaeda.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
166 Charlie Savage, U.S. Law May Allow Killings, Holder Says, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2012, at A18 
[hereinafter Savage, U.S. Law May Allow Killings]. 
167 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
168 Dehn & Heller, supra note 5, at 188. 
169 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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such practices.170  It is certainly a valid argument that problems exist when 
the United States detains its own citizens under military authority; but such 
concerns are beyond the scope of this Comment.  What is pertinent here is 
that an American citizen be given the chance to be captured or killed 
according to just war theory, and that his rights as an American citizen are 
not violated in the process. 
Consequently, capturing American citizens or killing them in traditional 
battles should be the only practices used by the United States against its own 
citizens.  Doing so is the only way to ensure that Americans in these 
situations receive proper due process under both the laws of war and laws of 
the United States itself.  Targeted killing does not allow for these rights to be 
recognized.  Therefore, United States citizens retain the rights of lex generalis 
under the Constitution even while being subjected to the lex specialis of 
armed conflict.171 
C. Morality and Law in the Targeting of American Citizens 
At the heart of the issue is not whether a state can actually use targeted 
killing against its own:  the United States proved that a state can do so when 
it targeted al-Aulaqi.  Instead, the question is whether it is legally—and 
morally—proper to do so.  When the United States targets its own citizens, 
there are three elements that come into play:  citizenship, premeditation, 
and due process.  Each element, when taken alone, may not be sufficient to 
allow the targeting of one’s own citizens to reach a level of iniquity.  When 
taken together, the interplay of these three factors points to a major 
undermining of one’s rights that can be expressed in a moral legal 
framework. 
1.  Legal Framework 
Although armed conflict necessarily allows the use of coercive measures 
that are not usually lawful in other contexts,172 International Humanitarian 
Law does not make certain distinctions.  Namely, International 
Humanitarian Law and the laws of war make no reference to nationality or 
citizenship when defining combatants in war.173 
When invoking the domestic analogy, it is nevertheless clear that even 
the United States takes citizenship into account to a certain extent because 
 
170 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (setting forth that the United States may 
detain its own citizens as enemy combatants, but that the writ of habeas corpus has not 
been suspended). 
171 Thanks to Professor Claire Finkelstein for conversations which sparked this idea. 
172 Kutz, supra note 14, at 152–53. 
173 First Additional Protocol, supra note 34, at arts. 43 & 44. 
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the domestic context infers American citizenship.174  The Obama 
Administration took into account citizenship both when it invoked domestic 
cases in the memorandum justifying the killing of al-Aulaqi and when it 
wrote the memo itself.175  By writing the memo, the Obama Administration 
effectively assented to the need for extra justification when a United States 
citizen is the object of targeted killing.  The laws of war, in this sense, are 
thus more permissive in that they do not take into account citizenship when 
targeted killing occurs, whereas domestic law does. 
The interpretation of the interplay between International Humanitarian 
Law and domestic law, as supposedly set forth in the Obama memorandum 
justifying the targeting of al-Aulaqi, is necessarily flawed, as it attempts to 
allow one to do in one context what the other would not allow.  In the 
domestic analogy, as in the laws of war, one may kill a criminal that poses an 
imminent threat.176  One may not, however, premeditatively kill a criminal 
that one thinks will commit a crime in the distant future.177  Conversely, 
International Humanitarian Law, to a certain extent, does allow preemptive 
strikes.178 
It seems that the United States uses domestic law to invoke citizenship, 
but then uses International Humanitarian Law to disregard the same 
element of citizenship.  When using targeted killing—a practice that is by 
definition premeditative—against its own citizens, the United States uses one 
law to allow them to do what another—domestic law—would not allow.  This 
is because domestic law, which does take into account citizenship, does not 
allow premeditative strikes, while International Humanitarian Law does not 
take into account citizenship but does allow certain premeditative strikes.  
The United States takes into account aspects of the domestic law, specifically 
one’s citizenship, to appear as if they are satisfying this law’s elements.  This 
effectively results in an end-run around domestic law in a manner that seems 
to set it forth as authoritative while simultaneously disregarding it.  The legal 
framework for the targeted killing of one’s own citizens is therefore tenuous 
at best. 
2.  Morality as Legal Framework 
But why does the United States invoke the domestic analogy at all?  If 
International Humanitarian Law does not take into account citizenship, 
then there is no need to even address it.  Regardless of this fact, the Obama 
 
174 Savage, U.S. Law May Allow Killings, supra note 166, at A18. 
175 Id.; Savage, Secret U.S. Memo, supra note 6, at A1. 
176 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1985). 
177 Id. 
178 WALZER, supra note 13, at 80–85. 
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Administration wrote an entire memo justifying its use of force against al-
Aulaqi.179  This could be because the Administration was simply trying to 
insulate itself from criticism.  But if this were the case, then it would behoove 
the Administration to release its analysis. 
Conversely, such a memo could possibly have been written because there 
is something normatively repugnant about the use of targeted killing against 
one’s own citizens.  A memo could thereby reassure the Administration that 
it was proceeding in a sound manner.  Even if an armed conflict exists in a 
traditional war, where the laws of war are more established, issues still 
remain regarding the targeted killing of one’s own citizens, and thus these 
concerns would still exist. 
It is not necessarily the process involved in targeted killing that causes 
apprehension, as even preapproval can lead to problems of its own.180  It is 
rather that there is a type of moral defect in a law that allows a government 
to kill its own citizens in such a manner.  “The State, even as it punishes, 
must treat its members with respect for their intrinsic worth as human 
beings.”181  However, it is precisely this human dignity of the targeted that is 
not taken into account.  The interplay of the human dignity of the targeted 
with the lack of due process given to American citizens points towards a 
normative problem with the targeted killing of one’s own citizens. 
It was asserted above that due process cannot be satisfied in the targeted 
killing of an American citizen by the United States.  While that argument 
still stands, the moral outrage of targeting one’s own citizen adds an extra 
element to the case against this practice.  Rather than International 
Humanitarian Law, it is the human rights model that lends credence to the 
analysis of evaluating the taking of our own citizens’ life.  The human rights 
model, codified in such treaties as the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and the International Covenantt on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”), is meant to promote “the inherent 
dignity and . . . the equal and inalienable rights of all.”182  The human rights 
model, however, defers to International Humanitarian Law during times of 
armed conflict.183  But this does not mean that such a deferral is appropriate.  
The right to life in the human rights model is non-derogable; one’s life can-
 
179 Savage, Secret U.S. Memo, supra note 6, at A1. 
180 See supra Part VI.B.3. 
181 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). 
182 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III), at preamble (Dec. 10, 1948). 
183 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 240 
(July 8) (“[W]hat is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be determined 
by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is 
designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities.”). 
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not be deprived arbitrarily.184  It is this morality that should be taken into 
account in the legal framework that sets the standards for the United States 
and its use of force, and it is this morality that should be implemented in 
order to circumvent the overly permissive character of International 
Humanitarian Law.  The human rights element seems to complement the 
domestic analogy in a manner consistent with the preservation of a citizen’s 
rights, as both the due process analysis under the Constitution and the 
human rights model would preserve a citizen’s right to life in the face of 
targeted killing. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Under the laws of war there are thus many constraints that apply to 
targeted killing regardless of one’s citizenship.  Targeted killing by the Unit-
ed States should only be used against combatants involved in an armed 
conflict with the United States.  Members of al-Qaeda should receive 
combatant status, with the corresponding protections and risks that this 
status entails, regardless of their citizenship.  The conflict between the 
United States and al-Qaeda may indeed be characterized as a non-
international armed conflict.  But the hostilities between the United States 
and AQAP may not, as there is not a sufficient amount of organization 
between al-Qaeda and AQAP to deem them one organization and because 
co-belligerency does not exist amongst non-state actors under the laws of 
war. 
A disproportionate amount of force may never be used against an 
enemy, and the enemy must always pose an imminent danger for force to be 
warranted.  The United States may therefore not use targeted killing when 
imminence is questionable, when capture is feasible, or when civilian lives 
are at risk of becoming collateral damage.  Problems exist when the United 
States uses CIA agents to engage in targeted killings, regardless of the 
citizenship of those they target.  The CIA is not part of the military, and thus 
its members are not combatants under just war theory.  They should not be 
able to use targeted killing against enemies in any circumstances. 
 
184 See, e.g., African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, art. 4, June 27, 1981, 1520 
U.N.T.S. 217 (“Human beings are inviolable.  Every human being shall be entitled to 
respect for his life and the integrity of his person.  No one may be arbitrarily deprived of 
this right.”); American Convention on Human Rights:  “Pact of San José, Costa Rica” art. 
4(1), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (“Every person has the right to have his life 
respected.  This right shall be protected by law . . . . No one shall be arbitrarily deprived 
of his life.”); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6(1), Dec. 19, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (“Every human being has the inherent right to life.  This right shall be 
protected by law.  No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”). 
960 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 15:3 
 
However, if the military were to carry out targeted killing, there is a 
conspicuous distinction that should be made based on one’s citizenship.  
That is, the United States should never partake in targeted killing against its 
own citizens.  No amount of due process is able to ameliorate the problems 
inherent with taking the life of one’s own citizens in this premeditated 
manner.  One’s right to life and to a trial under the Constitution forbids it.  
Indeed, sometimes the “laws we should adopt do not directly correspond to 
morality.”185  But sometimes they do.  An American’s right to life under the 
Constitution reveals such morality.  The lack of distinction in terms of one’s 
citizenship under the laws of war, however, does not do so.  The United 
States should therefore look to a combination of domestic law and the 
human rights model when dealing with its own citizens in terms of targeted 
killing.  The United States, as it does now, should take into account the 
citizenship of those that they target.  When the person that is targeted is an 
American citizen, the United States should defer to the human rights model; 
the United States should refrain from using targeted killing against its own 
citizens.  This is the only way the United States can adhere to the law while 
simultaneously invoking morality. 
 
185 FROWE, supra note 26, at 40. 
